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Financing the Postwar Housing Boom 
in Phoenix and Los Angeles, 1945-1960 
LYNNE PIERSON DOTI AND 
LARRY SCHWEIKART 
Lynne Pierson Doti is a member of the 
economics department at Chapman College and 
Larry Schweikart is a member of the 
history department in the University of Dayton. 
Real-estate booms have occurred regularly in the 
American past and played an important role in the settle- 
ment of both rural and urban areas.' After World War II, 
Americans experienced a general migration from rural to 
urban and suburban areas and from the Midwest and East to 
the so-called "Sunbelt states," particularly Florida, Texas, Ari- 
zona, and California. California and Arizona both grew by 
more than a hundred percent between 1945 and 1960, and 
Larry Schweikart wishes to acknowledge financial support received from the 
Research Institute of the University of Dayton, the Charles Redd Center for 
Western Studies, and the Earhart Foundation. 
1. Material on land booms appears in Vernon Carstensen, ed., The Public 
Lands (Madison, 1963); Douglass North, The Economic Growth of the United 
States, 1790-1860 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1961); North, Growth and Welfare in the 
American Past (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966); Paul Wallace Gates, "The Role of 
the Land Speculator in Western Development," Pennsylvania Magazine of History 
and Biography, LXVI (1942), 314-333; Allan and Margaret Bogue, "Profits and 
the Frontier Land Speculator," Journal of Economic History, XVII (1957), 1-24; 
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two cities that reflected this phenomenal increase were Phoe- 
nix and Los Angeles. Both shared more than sunshine. Dur- 
ing the war they had supported numerous defense workers 
and thousands of military personnel, many of whom passed 
through the two cities on their way to the front. The G.I. bill, 
with its offer of inexpensive financing and low down pay- 
ments for housing, persuaded newcomers to stay, and earlier 
visitors to return and buy homes-homes that could be built 
and sold inexpensively because Phoenix and Los Angeles 
possessed large parcels of agricultural land suitable for con- 
version to mass-produced tracts of housing. Both cities had 
automobile-based transportation systems in place by World 
War II, and developers no longer had to depend upon public 
transit facilities to entice buyers. Although scholars have 
described the urban growth of Phoenix and Los Angeles dur- 
ing the fifteen years following World War II, they have largely 
ignored the financial arrangements that supported the resi- 
dential boom in the two cities.2 A review of the real estate 
market from 1945 to 1960 reveals that banks and other finan- 
Milton Heath, Constructive Liberalism (Cambridge, Mass., 1954); John Kenneth 
Galbraith, The Great Crash (Boston, 1955); and Richard Sylla, "Federal Policy, 
Banking, Market Structure and Capital Mobilization in the United States, 
1863-1913," Journal of Economic History, XIX (1969), 659-686; Gene Smiley, 
"Interest Rate Movements in the United States, 1888-1913," ibid., XXV (1975), 
591-620; and John James, "The Development of the National Money Market, 
1893-1911," ibid., XXXVI (1976), 878-897. Land booms in the nineteenth cen- 
tury, as well as speculative activity in Florida in the twentieth century, were 
shaped by the availability of credit. In these early booms, credit was supplied 
mostly by the federal government, railroad companies, or individuals who 
made financing available as an adjunct to the sale of property they had acquired 
in anticipation of the boom. Organized financial institutions generally developed 
after the speculative fever had cooled. 
2. For background on the growth of Phoenix and Los Angeles, see 
Bradford Luckingham, "The City in the Westward Movement: A Bibliographical 
Note," Western Historical Quarterly, V (1974), 305; Luckingham, The Urban South- 
west: A Profile History of Albuquerque, El Paso, Phoenix, and Tucson (El Paso, Tex., 
1982); Geoffrey P. Mawn, "Phoenix, Arizona: Central City of the Southwest, 
1820-1920" (Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona State University, 1979); Michael 
Kotlanger, Jr., "Phoenix, Arizona: 1920-1940" (Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona State 
University, 1983); Johnathan Kandell, "Historians of West Are Shedding 
'Cowboy' Image and Gaining Acceptance," New York Times, Oct. 15, 1972; D. W. 
Meinig, Southwest: Three Peoples in Geographic Change, 1600-1970 (New York, 
1971); W. Eugene Hollon, The Southwest: Old and New (Lincoln, Neb., 1961); 
Kirkpatrick Sale, Power Shift: The Rise of the Southern Rim and Its Challenge to the 
Eastern Establishment (New York, 1975); Carl Abbott, "The American Sunbelt: 
Idea and Region," Journal of the West, XXVIII (1979), 7, 8; and Abbott, The New 
Urban America: Growth and Politics in Sunbelt Cities (Chapel Hill, 1982). 
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cial institutions were in the forefront of the rapid real-estate 
expansion and that this expansion had a profound effect on 
these institutions.3 
Real estate financing following the war came primarily 
from three types of financial institutions -commercial banks, 
savings and loan companies, and insurance companies--with 
the first two playing by far the most important role. Savings 
and loan associations-mutual savings associations in which 
members (depositors) owned all the shares--specialized in 
holding interest-paying time deposits and making real estate 
loans. Commercial banks were publicly held corporations 
that specialized in demand deposits (checking accounts on 
which interest payments were not allowed from 1934 to 1980) 
and consumer and business (commercial) loans. Commercial 
banks chartered by the federal government were restricted in 
their ability to lend on real estate, but California and Arizona 
did not place similar restrictions on their state-chartered 
banks. At various times, commercial banks with state charters 
were active lenders in these markets. Insurance companies 
used accumulated premiums to purchase loans from the pri- 
mary lenders and also made construction loans directly to 
developers. Although in Los Angeles savings and loan asso- 
ciations (S&Ls) played a major role in financing residential 
growth, in Phoenix new banks created the initial develop- 
ment spark, and S&Ls and other nonbank financial institu- 
tions lured buyers with easy credit. Insurance money, mostly 
from firms headquartered in the East, was important in both 
Arizona and California.4 
3. Bradford Luckingham, "Phoenix: The Desert Metropolis," in Richard 
Bernard and Bradley Rice, eds., Sun Belt Cities: Politics and Growth Since World 
War II (Austin, 1983), 309-327; Remi Nadeu, Los Angeles: From Mission to Modern 
City (New York, 1960), 59, 73. On Huntington, see William Friedricks, "Henry 
Huntington and Metropolitan Entrepreneurship in Southern California, 1898- 
1917" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 1986). 
4. Secondary sources on banking in Arizona and California are found in 
Larry Schweikart and Lynne Pierson Doti, "Banking in the West: A Biblio- 
graphical Introduction," in Schweikart, ed., Banking in the West (Manhattan, 
Kan., 1984), 88-94. During the early development of American banks, as well as 
those in Europe, real-estate lending posed too great a risk for financial institu- 
tions. Savings and loan associations, originally called building and loan socie- 
ties, started as cooperative arrangements of savers who pooled their funds to 
build the members' homes. These societies were often converted to financial 
institutions, and by 1940 savings and loan associations specialized in real-estate 
lending and savings deposits. 
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In Phoenix, commercial bankers promoted and fueled 
the real estate market. Moreover, they engaged in boosterism 
and encouraged outsiders to move to the area as much as real 
estate brokers and developers did. The firms that captured 
the new mortgage business were small, new entrepreneurial 
banks that operated in competition with the established bank- 
ing "oligopoly." The success of these banks revealed the open- 
ness of financial markets. Although they still had to obtain a 
charter, there were few barriers to entry, especially since the 
larger banks had failed to recognize the potential of the real 
estate and mortgage markets. A similar shift in financial power 
occurred in the Los Angeles area. Commercial banks, once 
active lenders in the real estate market, lost a large share of 
this business to the more aggressive promotion efforts of the 
burgeoning savings and loan industry. 
Arizona's population growth began in earnest following 
World War II, picking up momentum in the 1950s with the 
widespread use of air conditioners. Virtually all of the popu- 
lation and business growth from 1946 to 1960 occurred in 
Phoenix and Tucson, with the former spurting past its south- 
ern neighbor to become one of the largest cities in the South- 
west. Phoenix's population quadrupled to over 439,000, its 
manufacturing output soared by almost 1,500 percent, and its 
incorporated area grew elevenfold. The city's economic 
growth, together with the natural beauty and healthful cli- 
mate, pulled in still others-mostly professionals, engineers, 
and technicians.5 
Among the biggest attractions was affordable real estate. 
Young Arizona developers such as John F. Long, Del Webb, 
Ralph Staggs, John Hall (Hallcraft Homes), Sam and Jack 
Hoffman (F & S Construction), and David Murdock tapped 
5. Michael Konig, "Postwar Phoenix, Arizona: Banking and Boosterism," 
Journal of the West, XXIII (1984), 72-76. See also Schweikart, "Collusion or 
Competition? Another Look at Banking in Arizona's Boom Years," Journal of 
Arizona History, XXVIII (1987), 189-200; Schweikart, A History of Banking in 
Arizona (Tucson, 1982), 115-147; Michael Konig, "Toward Metropolis Status: 
Charter Government and the Rise of Phoenix, Arizona, 1945-1960" (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Arizona State University, 1983). 
The term "Phoenix" refers to the "Valley of the Sun," Phoenix and its 
metropolitan area. Because of rapid expansion and annexation the term varied 
even in official definitions, but in 1960 would include most suburbs. 
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into the growing construction market in the early 1950s. While 
Long, Hall, Staggs, and the Hoffman brothers concentrated 
on residential housing, Webb and Murdock worked on sky- 
scrapers, hotels, and office buildings. Realtors such as Russ 
Lyon actively participated in "selling" the state in the early 
1960s. After the war the only restriction on Arizona's growth 
was cool air and ready cash. Air conditioners solved the first 
problem, but Arizona's depression-toughened banks could 
not supply enough credit to turn the tremendous potential of 
Phoenix into a marketable community. It was the federal 
government that provided the resources to generate this 
credit.6 
Much of Washington's interest in the state began during 
the war. Given the number of new and expanded military 
bases, housing was in short supply while the conflict raged, 
and the federal government classified the state as a "critical 
housing area," permitting Arizona developers to build when 
other areas of the country were denied the privilege. This 
availability of housing led promoters in the 1950s to note 
that, when industrial recruiters "advertised for skilled labor- 
ers in two locations simultaneously, the ratio of those who 
preferred Arizona to another location was between 5 to 1 and 
8 to 1."7 
Valley National Bank, headquartered in Phoenix and 
under the leadership of Walter and Carl Bimson, brought 
government credit into the state via another route, Federal 
Housing Administration loans, which dated back to 1934 and 
the passage of the National Housing Act. Carl, who was instru- 
mental in lobbying for the legislation, in 1935 took over the 
promotion of housing and real estate in Arizona. He "made a 
crusade of it, organizing crews to ring doorbells and talk up 
loans." In 1958 alone, construction permits in Tucson rose 
6. Harold Martin, "The New Millionaires of Phoenix," Saturday Evening 
Post, Sept. 30, 1961, pp. 25-30 (quotation from p. 30); Schweikart, That Quality 
Image: The History of Continental Bank (Tappan, N.Y., 1988). Other material on 
Continental Bank appears in the Archives of Continental Bank (hereafter cited 
as CB Archives), Chase Bank of Arizona, Scottsdale, Ariz. 
7. Larry Schweikart, interview with Carl Bimson, March 25, 1980, p. 1, in 
taped interview collection, Arizona State University Library (hereafter cited as 
ASUL), Phoenix. 
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324 percent. That same year Phoenix issued more than ten 
thousand building permits. Valley Bank made $400,000 worth 
of FHA-related mortgages in a single year, and over the same 
period the bank also invested $600,000 in uninsured loans in 
the Phoenix market. The state as a whole exceeded its FHA 
quota of $3 million in loans. From 1934 to 1945, Valley Bank 
alone made over 198,000 loans and had reached a national 
ranking of fifth in originating FHA loans in 1935.8 By 1945, 
Valley Bank held so many FHA loans that it could not make 
any more and still maintain a permissible loan-to-reserves 
ratio; thus, it attempted to broker the loans to third parties. 
When Transamerica, a large financial holding company that 
operated in five states at that time, purchased $1 million of 
the loans, Valley Bank advertised that it had an additional 
$1 million to lend locally. The real boom, however, still 
lay ahead.9 
In 1947 a small Phoenix insurance agency, the A. B. Robbs 
Agencies, received a phone call from Jack R. Smith, the West 
Coast investment representative of National Life of Vermont. 
Smith was seeking an Arizona correspondent to originate 
FHA and Veterans Administration loans, which were federally 
insured loans to assist veterans in obtaining home loans. 
Although A. B. Robbs, Sr., wanted nothing to do with any 
government agency for ideological reasons, his son, A. B., Jr., 
immediately recognized the potential for a program of this 
type. One hurdle had to be cleared. To originate FHA loans, 
the Robbs company had to have a net worth of $100,000, but it 
was capitalized at only half that amount. National Life solved 
the problem by appointing the Arizona firm its mortgage 
loan correspondent, thus guaranteeing the minimum net 
worth. Between 1947 and 1950 the Robbs company acquired 
8. Ibid.; Schweikart interview with Bimson, April 7, 1980, ibid; Bimson 
speech, Oct. 1952, in "Speeches of Carl Bimson," 127-136, unpublished collec- 
tion at Valley National Bank, Phoenix; "Condensed Financial Statement" of 
National Bank for year ending 1939, ibid. Residential housing starts for the 
greater Phoenix area in 1954 and 1959 were, respectively, 8,910 and 17,903. For 
the same dates in the Los Angeles area, the housing starts were 104,082 and 
90,269. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Housing Construction Statistics, 1889-1964 (Wash- 
ington, D.C., 1966), 108, 123. 
9. Schweikart, Bimson interview, March 25, 1980, pp. 4-5, ASUL; Ernest 
Hopkins, Financing the Frontier (Phoenix, 1950), 248. 
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the accounts of eight other eastern investors, who purchased 
more than $12 million in FHA/VA mortgages. In addition to 
initiating the loans, the Robbs agency collected the mort- 
gages from local households for a service fee. In the case of 
refinancing, the firm dealt with the tedious and confusing 
problems of sorting out the paperwork. Because each eastern 
investor was involved with thousands of contracts in a distant 
state, the Robbs Agencies filled an important and profitable 
niche by providing these mortgage-servicing functions.10 The 
volume of business conducted by this single firm was large 
not only for Arizona, but also in comparison to other Sunbelt 
states. In 1947, the Robbs firm alone did a third as much 
residential real-estate business as all the banks in Oklahoma 
combined. 
Gradually, the Robbs Agencies expanded into mortgage 
banking, and had the added business of insuring each new 
house that it financed. By 1950 the company had reached a 
level of $100,000 net worth and obtained a charter as an FHA- 
approved mortgagee in its own right, thereby enabling the 
firm to sell the mortgages it originated to numerous compa- 
nies approved by the FHA. It then expanded into the Tucson 
market as an independent but affiliated company--Newell & 
Robbs, Mortgage Bankers. 
In 1958, the A. B. Robbs Agencies became A. B. Robbs 
Trust Company, with powers similar to a commercial bank, 
including the privilege of accepting deposits and making all 
varieties of loans. Its growing FHA-mortgage-generating 
capacity coincided with the appointment of a mortgage lend- 
ing officer at Valley Bank whose "abrasive and opinionated" 
attitude had driven many of the young builder-developers 
away from that bank and into the offices of the A. B. Robbs 
Trust Company.11 
Even more important to the growth of Robbs's mortgage- 
10. Schweikart, interview ith A. B. Robbs, Jr., June 27, 1985, CB Archives; 
A. B. Robbs Company minute books, box 6, A. B. Robbs, Jr., Papers, ibid. 
11. Schweikart interview with Ruby Nelson, tape in CB Archives, June 
24, 1984; Schweikart, That Quality Image, 6. A trust company invested in various 
assets, including mortgages, on behalf of its customers. Trust companies also 
packaged mortgages and provided investors with bonds or with shares of the 
trust itself. 
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lending capacity than the developers' disaffection with Val- 
ley Bank and the disinterest ofthe other major banks was the 
firm's access to great amounts of mortgage capital in the hands 
of eastern investors. Robbs, Jr., personally sought out these 
investors, making tedious twenty-hour flights to New York in 
uncomfortable DC-9s. Relying purely on footwork and sales- 
manship, Robbs located likely prospects in the phone book, 
made appointments with them, and sold them on Arizona. 
He arrived at exclusive agreements with John Hancock Mutual 
Life Insurance Company, Travelers, Paul Revere Life Insur- 
ance Company, and a host of East Coast and Midwest savings 
banks. Among these savings institutions, the Williamsburgh 
Savings Bank, Seamen's Savings Bank, People's Savings Bank, 
and Bowery Savings Bank formed a New York base that served 
Continental Bank (which the Robbs Trust Company became 
in 1964) to the present. These secondary market sources had, 
by 1953, purchased $30 million worth of Arizona mortgages 
(Table 1). The Southwest represented a fertile investment 
field for home mortgages that became increasingly difficult 
to obtain in the East, both because of higher property costs 
and because of the growing attraction fSunbelt cities.12 
As eastern capital funnelled into Arizona, the housing 
boom reached its postwar peak. Phoenix ranked eleventh in 
the nation in 1958 with 16,200 new dwelling units, almost 
double the number constructed in 1956. As seen in Table 2, 
virtually all of the Phoenix construction consisted of single- 
unit homes, not apartments, indicating that the mortgage 
money contributed heavily to the housing boom. Of the new 
construction i Maricopa County, of which Phoenix is the 
hub, the A. B. Robbs Trust Company commanded twenty 
percent of the total mortgage-loan market for new housing. 
Robbs-related companies recorded mortgages totaling more 
than $2.5 million in May 1959 alone.'3 
Many of the Robbs Trust Company's nonresidential con- 
12. Schweikart, That Quality Image, 8-10. Continental merged with Chase 
in 1985, and is now Chase Bank. 
13. See A. B. Robbs Trust Company, "Dispatch," June 1959, CB Archives. 
Pima County, in which Tucson is located, also grew, but at less spectacular 
rates; building permits rose from 3,303 in 1956 to 4,206 in 1958. 
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Table 1. A. B. Robbs Company: Outstanding Principal Balances 
as of the December, 1953, Closings 
$ 2,798,776.64 National Life of Vermont 
5,759,310.13 John Hancock Mutual Life 
305,832.82 Kansas City Life 
572,193.78 Paul Revere Life 
3,225,275.86 Brooklyn Savings Bank 
653,591.61 City Savings Bank 
101,041.26 Columbia National Life 
737,255.36 Dollar Savings Bank 
1,385,954.90 Eastchester Savings Bank 
1,156,181.71 East River Savings Bank 
2,792,402.70 Erie County Savings Bank 
3,816,310.99 Federal National Mortgage Association 
210,039.94 Greater New York Savings Bank 
2,969,948.12 Greenwich Savings Bank 
789,875.94 American Irving Savings Bank 
292,288.01 Massachusetts Protective Association 
584,053.61 New Hampshire Savings Bank 
1,258,573.54 People's Savings Bank 
716,564.64 Philadelphia Savings & Loan Society 
70,949.74 Half-Dime Savings Bank 
$30,196,421.30 20 investors 
Source: A. B. Robbs Company ledger 
Table 2. Type of Housing Structures, 1954-1960 
(in thousands of units) 
Phoenix Los Angeles 
5 or more 5 or more 
Year 1 unit 2-4 units 1 unit 2-4 units 
1954 8.2 0.4 0.2 78.2 7.1 1.8 
1959 13.3 2.0 2.5 47.3 8.1 34.7 
1960 N/A N/A N/A 40.4 7.2 34.0 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Housing Construction Statistics, 1899-1964 
(Washington, D.C., 1966), 108, 123. 
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struction loans went to developer David Murdock. After 
receiving a loan from Valley Bank that pulled him out of 
early financial troubles, Murdock again returned to Robbs 
for funds for "multimillion-dollar redevelopment of whole 
downtown blocks." By 1961 he had constructed nineteen office 
buildings in Phoenix, including the city's first skyscraper of 
significance (the Guaranty Bank Building), and in the pro- 
cess had borrowed $20 million, mostly through Robbs Trust 
Company financing.'4 
While the A. B. Robbs Trust Company was the most 
active firm in both Phoenix and Arizona mortgage lending, 
it was by no means the only one. Jim Patrick, executive vice- 
president of the Valley Bank, sought to mend the rift between 
Valley and the developers that had existed since the early 
1950s. To repair the damage, he often "served as guide, coun- 
selor and financial backer" to most of the developers, lending 
to many of the same builders as Robbs. But Patrick's bank- 
unlike the Robbs Trust Company-did not have access to 
eastern capital. In 1963, for example, the Robbs Company 
had forty-nine eastern investors whose principal balances 
in the Robbs Trust Company totaled $228.6 million that 
was used by the Arizona company to make FHA loans on 
real estate. No other bank in the state could boast such 
capitalization.15 
Due to the potential gains in areas of development and 
finance, yet to be tapped by either the A. B. Robbs Trust 
Company or existing banks, Robbs had, during the early 
1960s, joined developer David Murdock in an alliance to 
create yet another financial entity specifically designed to 
handle all aspects of the real estate business, Financial Cor- 
poration of Arizona (FCA). FCA consisted of several firms 
merged into one broad financial services institution that Robbs 
called "the first publicly held, diversified financial holding 
company in Arizona." It had the potential of expanding even 
further until a vice-president embezzled more than $1 mil- 
lion, causing FCA to collapse.16 
14. Martin, "New Millionaires," 20. 
15. Ibid.; Continental Bank, "Total Servicing," CB Archives. 
16. Schweikart, That Quality Image, 13-14; Schweikart interviews with Robbs 
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Still seeing other investment opportunities, but dissatis- 
fied with FCA, in 1964 Robbs opened his own bank, Conti- 
nental National Bank. In addition to retaining all of the 
original Robbs Trust Company accounts, Continental culti- 
vated new relationships with builders and investors. George 
Steinhilber took over the mortgage lending operations in 
1964 and assumed the difficult but critical task of cultivating 
the eastern accounts and, in the process, assuming Robbs's 
mantle of booster, promoting Phoenix as well as the trust 
company. The Robbs Company's conversion to a bank was in 
many ways a forerunner of modern deregulation, wherein 
banks are permitted to enter mortgage lending to a greater 
extent.17 
While Robbs was the most important of the Arizona fin- 
anciers and boosters, there were others. The Phoenix Cham- 
ber of Commerce recognized the value of an official city 
"promoter" and named Patrick Downey, an executive for Val- 
ley Bank, to that post. He lobbied such companies as Motorola, 
General Electric, and Sperry-Rand, always presenting target 
firms with a dossier on Phoenix-which included maps, tax 
information, labor statistics, and weather reports-that sold 
the city and the state as "especially conducive to technical 
industrial growth." These professionals--technicians and 
white-collar workers--purchased much of the new residen- 
tial housing in the 1950s after Downey, the chamber, and 
Valley Bank had "advertised" to their employees the virtues 
of the Sunbelt. At first the chamber of commerce purchased 
Downey's services from the bank, but when its funds became 
inadequate, Valley Bank paid Downey's salary for his pro- 
motional work. First National Bank also paid for individuals 
to work on behalf of the chamber of commerce, thus subsidiz- 
ing boosterism for the city and state. Through bank-sponsored 
and Lilymae Penton, July 19, 1985, CB Archives; Archie Kleven to Robbs, Jr., 
Aug. 12, 1963, folder 24, box 2, A. B. Robbs, Jr., Papers. Other material was 
provided in an off-the-record discussion that Schweikart had with David 
Murdock, May 29, 1986. Robbs lost half a million dollars; Murdock barely 
avoided bankruptcy, but doggedly rebuilt his company until it eventually stood 
as a national powerhouse among development firms. 
17. Robbs interview; Schweikart, That Quality Image, 14-23; A. B. Robbs, 
Jr., Papers, C. B. Archives; "Application to Organize a National Bank," folder 
1, box 13, ibid.; Schweikart interview with George Steinhilber, July 2, 1985. 
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publications such as Arizona Progress and Arizona, the state's 
banks encouraged residential real-estate sales by relating sta- 
tistics on public schools, taxation, labor, and employment 
growth.'8 
Thus, at the same time that great amounts of eastern 
capital began to flood into Arizona, enticed by the success of 
Valley Bank and the chamber's campaign and then facilitated 
by the A. B. Robbs Trust Company, important elements 
of the Phoenix banking community as a whole stimuated 
demand, especially in Phoenix. And because the interest rates 
provided by the FHA/VA mortgages were favorable, con- 
sumers had further eason to increase their demand for loans. 
Once the large corporations had moved into the Phoenix 
area and begun profitable operations, many of their engi- 
neers and mid-level executives broke off to form their own 
companies. Encouraging them to do so and sustaining the 
real-estate boom was the availability of start-up capital for 
small businesses. Such financing had earlier been largely 
ignored by local financial institutions. In 1963 the void was 
filled by a small, highly specialized firm, Thunderbird Bank. 
Sensing the change in local business patterns, its president, 
Robert McGee, shifted the bank's lending patterns to empha- 
size business credit instead of commercial or agricultural loans. 
During the late 1960s Thunderbird Bank emerged as a leading 
small-business bank in the Southwest and encouraged other 
lending institutions to follow its lead. By supplying credit to 
local entrepreneurs, Arizona's banks also ensured that long- 
term growth would succeed the short-term boom.19 
Arizona savings and loan companies also participated in 
the Phoenix land boom, with first-mortgage loans growing 
from $2.9 million to $92 million between 1946 and 1960. Over 
the same period, the number of savings and loans firms grew 
from two to seven, and one company clearly led the way. 
Western Savings and Loan made more than half ($54.5 mil- 
18. Transcript of an interview with Patrick Downey, July 8, 1978, Phoenix 
History Project, Western Savings Building, Phoenix; Konig, "Postwar Phoe- 
nix," 73. 
19. On Thunderbird Bank, see Schweikart, A Dynamic Legacy: Thunder- 
bird Bank, 1964-1985 (Phoenix, 1986). 
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lion) of the first mortgage loans extended by all S&Ls in 1960.20 
Still, this involvement by S&Ls remained a small seg- 
ment of the mortgage market; in 1953 the Robbs Company 
alone loaned $30 million--some $7 million more than the 
existing five savings and loan companies combined. It is also 
important to note that little "backflow"--the lending of Cali- 
fornia mortgage money to Arizona institutions -occurred. 
Had the California S&Ls been anxious to lend, they would 
have found local demand more than sufficient for the invest- 
ment of their funds. The records of the Arizona banks indi- 
cate that the sources of all outside mortgage funds were in the 
eastern states. Likewise, the books show that none of Arizo- 
na's mortgage money was used to buy California mortgages 
("relending"). In both Phoenix and Los Angeles the demand 
for financing soaked up all available local funds. 
In contrast to the situation in Arizona, California com- 
mercial banks, and particularly the smaller banks, were gen- 
erally reluctant to extend credit to the real-estate market. 
Although the amount that all commercial banks loaned on 
mortgages as a percent of assets rose from 6.9 percent in 
1945 to 20.7 percent in 1956, only a few of the largest banks 
participated. The reluctance of commercial bankers to meet 
the needs of developers and homeowners resulted in a very 
rapid growth in the number and size of savings and loan 
associations in California and stimulated inflows of large 
amounts of mortgage money through national life insurance 
companies.21 
California's postwar growth was also accelerated by the 
military concentrations and the defense and service indus- 
tries that arrived during the war. The population soared from 
6.9 million in 1940 to 10.6 million in 1950. Los Angeles 
20. Arizona Banking Dept., Annual Reports (Phoenix, 1946-1960). 
21. Richard Towey and Robert Lindsay, "Liquidity of California Banks," 
in Hyman Minsky, ed., California Banking in a Growing Economy, 1946-1975 (Berke- 
ley, 1964), 143. It should be noted that, unlike in Arizona, many corporate and 
bank archives in California are closed or restricted, and reports such as those 
cited in Minsky's volume contain much of this restricted material. Primary 
sources, in these cases, were not available to the authors. For other general 
material on California, see Governor's Banking and Study Committee, On the 
Future of Banking in California (San Francisco, 1965). 
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remained one of the fastest growing areas in the nation in the 
1950s, the number of residents expanding by over fifty-four 
percent in the decade. This phenomenal increase xceeded 
the willingness of the commercial banks in the metropolitan 
area to provide adequate financing. Although there was tre- 
mendous expansion in real-estate lending, most banks tended 
to invest in the bond market, replacing war bonds in their 
portfolios with school, utility, and other public issues. The 
exceptions were three or four of the state's largest commer- 
cial banks, including the Bank of America.22 
Though few in number, they loaned staggering amounts 
of money, especially in Los Angeles, where their share of the 
mortgage market exceeded that of all other local agencies 
combined. As early as 1948 the Bank of America had $600 
million in Veterans Administration l ans, or about ten per- 
cent of all such loans in the nation.23 The Bank of America's 
foray into real-estate lending during the war and postwar 
period was a departure from the policy of founder A. P. 
Giannini, who in contrast to A. B. Robbs, Jr., and Gilbert 
Bradley in Arizona, had opposed loans to real-estate devel- 
opers. The new strategy may have reflected a turnover in 
management but was probably due more to the patriotic aura 
that new housing had gained in the war years. The bank 
granted Los Angeles builder Paul Trousdale advances of up 
to eight million dollars when he was building "two houses a 
day, seven days a week," for war-industry employees; this 
sum multiplied fourfold within a few years after the war. 
When Henry Kaiser applied his Liberty ship methods to 
postwar home building in southern California, the Bank of 
America extended some $50 million for a single project call- 
22. John Cox, "Institutional Mortgage Lending in the Los Angeles Met- 
ropolitan Area, 1953-54 and 1957-58" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of South- 
ern California, 1962), 44. In the 1950 census, the Los Angeles/Long Beach 
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) included Orange County. 
Orange County began to grow rapidly in the 1950s and was a separate Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (Anaheim/Santa Ana/Garden Grove) in the 1960 
census. Growth in the SMSA was 225 percent between 1950 and 1960. The term 
"Los Angeles area" refers to the pre-1960 definition. 
23. Marquis James and Bessie James, Biography of a Bank: The Story of 
Bank of America (New York, 1954), 417, 490; Federal Reserve Board of Gover- 
nors, Federal Reserve Board: All Bank Statistics, 1896-1969 (Washington, D.C., 1965). 
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ing for six thousand homes. Meanwhile, Henry Doegler 
received $75 million from the bank for developments west of 
Los Angeles. But most commercial banks avoided develop- 
ers, apparently sharing the pride of the Farmers and Mer- 
chants Bank of Los Angeles which boasted that it "rarely 
made loans to subdividers and builders for the development 
of large tracts."24 
There had been a brief flirtation with the mortgage mar- 
kets by commercial banks in the years 1946-1950, when banks 
were holding over half of the institutionally held mortgage 
debt in the state. Banks were particularly attracted to the 
federally guaranteed mortgages, viewing them as a safe and 
liquid investment. The large amount of savings deposits pro- 
vided a stable source of funds for this lending.25 But even in 
the early postwar period, when a few banks dominated the 
primary mortgage market, this large amount of deposits meant 
California banks as a group never approached the legal lim- 
its for real-estate loans in their portfolios. Federal statutes 
allowed a chartered national bank to loan on real estate up to 
sixty percent of its time deposits, and government-insured 
loans were excluded in making this calculation. State banks - 
those chartered under California law-had no limit on the 
total amount of their investments that they could devote to 
real-estate loans. The generous ceilings, and very high vol- 
ume of time deposits, which constituted nearly half of all 
California bank deposits in the early postwar period, ensured 
that few banks were constrained by regulatory restrictions. 
Los Angeles banks, for example, could have doubled their 
total real-estate loans outstanding for 1946-1951 and still not 
have exceeded federal limits.26 
After 1950, banks declined rapidly in importance relative 
24. James and James, Biography of a Bank, 241, 470, 490; Robert Cleland 
and Frank Putnam, Isaias Hellman and the Farmers and Merchants Bank (San 
Marino, Calif., 1965), 102. 
25. Frederic Morrissey, "The Allocation of Funds by the Commercial 
Banks in the California Economy, 1946-1975," in Minsky, ed., California Banking, 
249; James Gilles and Clayton Curtis, Institutional Residential Mortgage Lending 
in Los Angeles County, 1946-51: Six Significant Years of Mortgage Lending (Los 
Angeles, 1956), 66. 
26. Federal Reserve Board, All Bank Statistics, 150; Gillies and Curtis, 
Institutional Residential Mortgage Lending, 70. 
This content downloaded from 206.211.139.204 on Fri, 9 Jan 2015 13:49:23 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
188 Pacific Historical Review 
to other eal-estate l nders. It is not clear why banks failed to 
respond to the demand for real-estate loans, but two factors 
probably contributed. The first was the leveling off of prices 
in the real-estate market hat began in 1949. This three-year 
lull may have reminded the banks of earlier eal-estate booms 
in the 1800s, 1920s, and other less spectacular years when 
suddenly overextended borrowers had caused bankers to lose 
sleep. Another possible reason for the shift could have been 
the attraction of rising interest rates on government bonds. 
In 1946 and 1947, banks had been anxious to move out of 
low-yielding government bonds, but by 1948 the differential 
between mortgage rates and interest rates on federal, state, 
and local bonds had declined. A temporary disturbance in
the secondary market for government-insured mortgages, 
caused by the dissolution of the Reconstruction Fi ance Cor- 
poration (RFC), may also have contributed tothe bankers' 
loss of enthusiasm for mortgages. From October 1946 to the 
middle of 1947, lenders could sell VA-guaranteed loans to the 
RFC Mortgage Company. The RFC was discontinued inJuly 
1947; the newly created agency, Federal National Mortgage 
Association, was not allowed to buy VA mortgages in large 
quantities from a single lender until October 1949. That dis- 
turbance in the secondary market caused a distinct corres- 
ponding drop in new VA mortgages. 
As increases in the number of real-estate loans in bank- 
ers' portfolios moderated, the gap was quickly filled by sav- 
ings and loan associations and life insurance companies. The 
growth of the savings and loan associations was rapid and 
surprising, as recorded in the Annals of the United States 
savings and loan industry from 1946 to 1954. Among the 
articles expressing fear of communism and public housing, 
there were steadily increasing comments on events in Cali- 
fornia. In 1949, the Annals noted that California savings and 
loan associations held about $870 million in mortgage loans, 
making its savings and loan industry the third largest in 
the nation, behind the traditionally strong savings and loan 
associations of Ohio and New York. The entire industry had 
about $10 billion in loans outstanding nationwide that year. 
In 1952 the association reported that California S&Ls had 
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moved into second place in the size of assets. A year later 
California's growth rate was the fastest among the states- 
33 percent compared to 18 percent nationwide. In 1954 leaders 
of the organization registered congratulations and astonish- 
ment when California savings and loan associations increased 
their assets by another $512 million and reported $2.3 billion 
in outstanding mortgages.27 
The growth of the savings and loan industry in Califor- 
nia continued throughout the 1950s. A 1960 report by the 
Stanford Research Institute calculated the growth in new firms 
over the decade at 34 percent, the number of home and branch 
offices at 159 percent, and the growth rate in the number of 
mortgage loans at 521 percent. Most of this increase occurred 
in southern California; 65 percent of the assets of the savings 
and loan associations in California in 1959 were in the portfo- 
lios of firms headquartered in Los Angeles.28 This aggressive 
expansion by the savings and loan industry did not, however, 
make the mortgage market independent of the commercial 
banks where much larger overall size continued to make them 
the largest holders of mortgages. 
Still, the rising importance of savings and loan associa- 
tions did have a significant impact on the mortgage market. 
S&Ls were more willing than banks to lend in the "used" 
housing market with about half their loans financing resales 
rather than new construction. Builders and developers, espe- 
cially in southern California, found savings and loans more 
accommodating than banks. They provided more funds for a 
project and were more generous in their estimates of the 
borrower's credit-worthiness. Although there were large var- 
iations between individual savings and loan associations, an 
overall shift occurred in their preference for more profitable 
conventional loans rather than FHA or VA loans.29 In the 
1950s and 1960s the S&Ls built a base of conventional loans 
using government-insured loans primarily as a liquid asset 
since they could be easily converted to cash. This liquidity 
27. United States Savings and Loan League, Savings and Loan Annals 
(1946-1954); Annual Reports of the United States Savings and Loan League (1946-1954). 
28. C. J. Clawson, F. W. Barsalow et al., The Savings and Loan Industry in 
California (South Pasadena, Calif., 1960), pp. II, 2, 5. 
29. Ned Eichler, The Merchant Builders (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), 52-53. 
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was acquired when the level of savings deposits was abnormally 
high, but when growth slumped and cash was hard to obtain, 
these insured loans were then sold to the Federal National 
Mortgage Association. 
The growth of savings and loan associations also helped 
change the distribution of time-and-demand deposits in the 
commercial banks. From 1945 to 1963 the demand deposits of 
California banks grew faster than the national average. Prior 
to deregulation in the 1970s and 1980s, financial institutions 
could not pay interest on demand deposits, but they could do 
so on time deposits and savings accounts. As a result S&L 
time deposits increased by 3,600 percent while those of banks 
grew 350 percent." 
Life insurance companies also attempted to satisfy the 
rising demand for mortgage money in California. In 1949, 
national life insurance companies, holding over ninety per- 
cent of the industry's total assets, received authorization to 
operate in California. From 1949 to 1954 their proportion of 
outstanding real-estate loans in the state rose from twenty- 
nine percent to thirty-three percent. By 1951 only thirty of 
the 200 life insurance companies doing business in the state 
had made no mortgage loans. Although their importance in 
the overall market declined slightly after 1954, the number of 
companies operating increased by seventy percent in the 
1950s, and their mortgage loans increased 319 percent. Thir- 
teen percent of all real-estate loans made by life insurance 
companies throughout the nation were within California by 
the end of the decade.31 
Life insurance companies and savings and loan associa- 
tions competed successfully with the commercial banks because 
of the more liberal terms offered to borrowers. Banks in 
California were limited to twenty-four-year loans for no more 
than seventy-five percent of the property's assessed valua- 
tion. The savings and loan associations could loan eighty 
percent of the assessed value for up to twenty-five years, and 
30. Minsky, ed., California Banking, 110, 260, 267; Gillies and Curtis, 
Institutional Residential Mortgage Lending, 47; Cox, "Institutional Mortgage Lend- 
ing," 150. 
31. Cox, "Institutional Mortgage Lending," 115-117. 
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life insurance companies often extended even more lenient 
terms. 
In contrast to the banks in California, savings and loan 
associations and life insurance companies also relied on funds 
from other states to fuel the expanding real-estate market. In 
the early years of the expansion, when banks dominated the 
market, most of their funds were derived from the time depos- 
its of the rapidly growing local population. As the savings 
and loan associations gained ascendancy in the early 1950s, 
the time deposits of commercial banks grow more slowly, and 
many of their new loans were refinancing transactions asso- 
ciated with the resale of existing homes. Virtually none of the 
banks' sources of funds for real-estate loans came from cus- 
tomers out of state. On the other hand, the savings and loan 
associations came to depend increasingly on out-of-state 
sources. In 1960, some 18.5 percent of the funds in California 
savings and loan deposits came from residents in other states. 
Life insurance companies imported seventy-seven percent of 
their funds from out of the state.32 
Los Angeles and its suburbs magnified the trends that 
characterized real-estate financing in the rest of the state. 
Indeed, Los Angeles often set the trend in mortgage lending. 
The population of Los Angeles County increased by fifty 
percent between 1940 and 1950, mostly through immigration 
of defense-industry workers and their families. The increase 
of ninety-eight percent in real (inflation-adjusted) income was 
even more dramatic.33 The Los Angeles area also had a pat- 
tern of industrial development that helped fuel the residen- 
tial boom. Defense-related industries had located in several 
towns and cities within the Los Angeles metropolitan area- 
notably Long Beach, San Pedro, Fontana, Seal Beach, and 
Santa Ana. These areas all had large, open agricultural fields 
that provided suitable spots for "tracts" where fifty to a hun- 
dred or more homes could be built at the same time. Thus, 
tracts of homes rapidly replaced bean fields and orange groves. 
The 1954 recession slowed Los Angeles's growth consid- 
32. Schaff, "Savings Function and Mortgage Investment," 254; Gillies 
and Curtis, Institutional Residential Mortgage Lending, 99-101. 
33. Minsky, "Commercial Banking," 121. 
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erably, however, and shifted building activity into multiple- 
dwelling units (apartments). Multi-unit dwellings shot up 
much faster in Los Angeles than in Phoenix from 1954 to 
1960, especially after 1955; the boom in single-family homes 
before that time had saturated the area with residential homes 
(Table 2). By 1950, fifty-six percent of all residential units in 
Los Angeles and its suburbs were owner-occupied, single- 
family buildings. From 1946 to 1951 single-family homes in 
the Los Angeles area increased fifty-five p rcent, about eighty- 
five percent of them purchased with borrowed funds.34 
As in California overall, banks had been the most impor- 
tant source for mortgage funds for Los Angeles and the sub- 
urbs from 1946 to 1949. Thereafter, however, the emerging 
competition from the savings and loan industry and life insur- 
ance companies was even more dramatic there than in the rest 
of the state. The amount of Los Angeles real-estate lending 
by the savings and loan associations first surpassed that of 
banks in 1949 and far exceeded it by 1951; life insurance 
companies passed the commercial banks in 1950 (Table 3). 
Table 3. Source of Residential Mortgage Loans of $20,000 or Less 
in Los Angeles County ($ millions) 
Year Savings and Loans Banks Life Insurance Companies 
1946 148 313 50 
1947 200 382 83 
1948 217 248 102 
1949 219 178 121 
1950 456 245 271 
1951 425 219 256 
Source: James Gillies and Clayton Curtis, Institutional Residential Mortgage 
Lending, 1946-1951: Six Significant Years of Mortgage Lending (Los Angeles, 
1956), appendix, table 7. 
34. Gillies and Curtis, Institutional Residential Mortgage Lending, 10-11. In 
Arizona, the recession also struck the real-estate industry but the boosterism of 
Arizona businesses, combined with the expansion of air conditioning as a method 
of cooling houses and commercial buildings, offset some of the recession-related 
drop. This recession, however, had already convinced Robbs to diversify his 
mortgage-lending operations into commercial banking. 
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The intense demand for housing in Los Angeles during 
the entire period 1945-1960 meant that mortgage lenders 
had considerable difficulty in attracting a sufficient volume 
of funds to loan out. Banks limited their fund-raising attempts 
to solicitations of local depositors, but savings and loan asso- 
ciations followed a more aggressive campaign. The payment 
of high interest on time deposits was an important way Los 
Angeles S&Ls attracted more funds. Interest rates (called div- 
idends) on savings deposits in Los Angeles often exceeded 
three percent during a period when the prevailing rate on 
deposits in the rest of California was 2.5 to three percent. 
With this incentive, Los Angeles savings and loan associa- 
tions attracted 7.2 percent of their deposits from outside the 
metropolitan area in 1951, and they increased that figure to 
eighteen percent by 1959.35 
Life insurance companies also brought funds into the Los 
Angeles area. Almost half of their funds were outside the 
area in 1955-1956. Overall, outside funds financed about 
twenty percent of Los Angeles mortgages in the 1950s, accord- 
ing to an estimate by John Cox. If the criterion for outside 
funds is the location of the principal office of the loan-granting 
institution, the flow of funds into the area is even more pro- 
nounced; the Cox study indicated that about half of the mort- 
gage loans in the early 1950s came from institutions with 
headquarters outside the Los Angeles area, although that 
proportion had declined to about a third by 1960.36 
All Los Angeles County financial institutions gained funds 
for new loans by selling the mortgages in their portfolios to 
the Federal National Mortgage Association. In 1951 a remark- 
able 23.5 percent of the $677 million of FHA and VA mort- 
gages that this government agency bought nationwide were 
linked to Los Angeles properties.37 
The California real-estate boom in the late 1940s pro- 
duced lasting changes in the state's financial industry. The 
defense-related industries attracted large inflows of people 
35. Ibid., 59-60. 
36. Cox, "Institutional Mortgage Lending," 92, 101. Cox's information is 
based on survey data that has been closed to outside researchers. 
37. Gillies and Curtis, Institutional Residential Mortgage Lending, 194. 
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from other states and stimulated the building industry. Local 
banks, dependent upon their savings deposits to finance loans 
on real estate, were unable to attract sufficient funds because 
of the low interest they paid to depositors. This weakness, 
combined with fears about the risks associated with the possi- 
bility of another overblown land boom, led to their decreased 
willingness to lend on real estate. The position of the banks 
in the real-estate market eroded in the 1950s when savings 
and loan associations and life insurance companies stepped 
in to assume those added risks. Savings and loan associations 
emerged as the dominant force in the mortgage market, and 
despite some deterioration thereafter, they remained in that 
position through the mid-1980s. 
The real estate land boom of 1945 to 1960 also wrought 
changes in the structure of financial institutions in both Ari- 
zona and California. Whereas in Phoenix the boom had given 
rise to new commercial banks and fostered promotional efforts 
by the business and banking community to encourage fur- 
ther migration, in Los Angeles the population was already in 
place and little promotion was needed. Phoenix entrepre- 
neurs and some bankers pursued both innovative financing 
and advertising plans -for example, California bankers were 
less creative (but Los Angeles savings and loan institutions 
provided the innovative financing to fuel the boom). In both 
locations the boom had the same impact on the major com- 
mercial banks: the existing giants lost market share to the 
new and more flexible financial institutions. Both Phoenix 
and Los Angeles witnessed inflows of capital from eastern 
and midwestern investors, particularly insurance companies. 
As a result, the eastern financial centers unwittingly sponsored 
the growth of the very region that, by the 1980s, challenged 
the economic, demographic, and political position of the 
declining rustbelt. 
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